The goal of this article is to develop a principled understanding of when it is beneficial to bundle technologies or services whose value is heavily dependent on the size of their user base, that is, exhibits positive exernalities. Of interest is how the joint distribution, and in particular the correlation, of the values users assign to components of a bundle affect its odds of success. The results offer insight and guidelines for deciding when bundling new Internet technologies or services can help improve their overall adoption. In particular, successful outcomes appear to require a minimum level of value correlation.
INTRODUCTION
Many Internet technologies, applications, and services 1 have value that increases with the size of their user base, that is, they exhibit positive externalities or network effects. Externalities are well known [Cabral 1990 ] to have dual effects on the adoption pattern of services. Adoption rapidly accelerates after passing a critical threshold (until the market starts saturating), but reaching this critical level of adoption is often slow and difficult. In practice, services that fail often do so during this early stage, as many potential adopters see a cost that exceeds the (low) initial value of the service. This is commonly mentioned as an explanation for the limited or stalled adoption of many Internet security protocols [Ozment and Schechter 2006] .
A common approach (see again Ozment and Schechter [2006] ) to overcome this initial hurdle is to bundle services in the hope that the bundle has broader appeal and is therefore able to overcome early adoption inertia. The main unknown is the extent to which dependencies (as measured by a joint distribution) or correlation in how users value the individual services influence their adoption decision for the bundle. We illustrate this issue next by way of examples that also (and more importantly) demonstrate the diversity of these Internet services for which this arises.
Anonymous Communications and Secure Distributed Storage
Anonymous communication systems have been available for some time, for example, see Fernández Franco [2012] for a recent survey. However, despite a recent rise in both profile [Arthur 2013 ] and usage [Brewster 2013 ], they remain relatively marginal, that is, have not yet attracted a large user base. This can affect their robustness and ability to deliver strong anonymity guarantees (mixing traffic from more users and tapping into the resources contributed by these users can improve both anonymity and robustness, at least in P2P-based implementations of such systems).
Overcoming the limited appeal (to users) of anonymous communications and increasing the number of users into which such a system can tap can be realized by bundling it with another service. Ideally, this other service should exhibit technical synergies with anonymous communications soas to facilitate a joint implementation. Secure distributed storage is a possible candidate. It enables the automatic and encrypted backup of local files over a distributed set of network peers (see BuddyBackup 2 for an example) and shares with anonymous communications a reliance on cryptographic primitives and protocols, as well as a value that grows with its number of adopters (more users likely means a more reliable system). The main question is whether combining these two services can increase adoption for both. The answer depends on the cost versus value of the bundle and how this trade-off varies across users.
The cost of the bundle consists of the communication (bandwidth), processing, and storage costs of the two services, with anonymous communications calling mostly for bandwidth and processing resources and secure distributed storage requiring primarily storage resources and, to a lesser extent, processing and communication resources. Because the two services have mostly independent needs, these costs should be approximately additive. The value a user assigns to the bundle depends on her level of usage of anonymous communications and reliance on secure distributed storage as a means of preserving and accessing her personal data. This value will change as more users adopt the bundle (it improves the quality and reliability of both services), but the decisions of early adopters depend primarily on how they intrinsically value access to anonymous communication and secure distributed storage.
For illustration purposes, assume that, within a given user population, the standalone values of both services are uniformly distributed. However, to reflect the fact that secure distributed storage should be attractive to most users while anonymous communications will likely have more limited appeal, we assume that the standalone values of the former are in [a, 1], 0 < a < 1, while spanning the full [0, 1] range for the latter. In other words, most users view secure distributed storage as useful (valued at ≥ a), while fewer assign a similar value (in the range [a, 1]) to anonymous communications. Under these assumptions, correlation in user valuations clearly affects the number of early adopters the service bundle will attract. For example, it is relatively easy to show (see Section 4 for related derivation details) that the cost threshold beyond which there are no early adopters for the bundle is 2 under perfect positive correlation, but only a + 1 under perfect negative correlation.
Online Discussion Forums
Consider next the case of an online discussion forum 3 dedicated to a particular topic. Participating in such a forum has some intrinsic value, for instance, from access to promotions and discounts on related products, but its core value often comes from the answers and advice it provides in response to users' questions. To succeed, a forum must therefore accumulate sufficiently large "knowledge base" and consequently achieve a critical mass of users. This can be challenging, as the added value from Q&A's is essentially absent in the early stages, and promotions and discounts alone may be insufficient to attract enough early adopters. Combining the topics of multiple forums under a common umbrella is one way to address this challenge. The standalone value of such a "bundled" forum, for example, promotions and discounts that now extend across more products, may appeal to a broader user base and thus allow it to succeed where individual forums would not. The question we seek to answer is, again, when and why this may be the case?
As with anonymous communications and secure distributed storage, whether a bundled forum attracts more early adopters and therefore improves its odds of success depends on its initial cost-benefit ratio relative to that of individual forums. The "cost" of joining a bundled forum, such as the amount of time needed to extract useful information, can be higher than that of more focused, single-topic forums. Its combined standalone value arguably depends on many factors, but a reasonable first approximation is again to assume it is the sum of the standalone values (product promotions and discounts) associated with both topics. As in the previous example, whether this sum exceeds the cost of joining the forum (that determines the number of early adopters) depends to a large extent on the joint distribution of user valuations for the individual forums, an important measure of which is their correlation.
For the purpose of illustration, consider a scenario where we contemplate merging two discussion forums whose standalone values follow identical uniform distributions when measured across a population of users (they are of equal value on average). Assume further that, for a given user, the values she sees in the two forums are either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated, namely equal or diametrically opposed. Under perfect positive correlation, the standalone value that any user derives from the bundled forum is then simply twice the value she sees in either individual forum. If we assume that the cost of joining the bundled forum is also twice that of joining a single-topic forum (e.g., it takes twice as long to find relevant information), then it is easy to show that bundling has no impact on early adoption and that the bundled forum sees the same number of potential early adopters 4 as either original forum. In contrast, when values are perfectly negatively correlated, all users now see the same (average) value from joining the bundled forum. In this case either no user or all users will be early adopters, depending on whether this average value is above or below the bundle's cost. Hence, unlike the case of perfect positive correlation, bundling can significantly affect the number of early adopters.
Summary
As the previous examples have hopefully illustrated, correlation in how users value different services and/or technologies (and, more generally, their joint distribution) can have a significant effect on whether combining them in a bundle is beneficial. In the rest of this article, we explore this issue in a systematic fashion. Section 2 offers a brief review of related works. Section 3 introduces our model for service adoption, while Section 4 considers the case where user affinities for the services are represented as continuous uniform random variables. It first explores the extreme cases of perfect positive and negative correlation in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, respectively, while Section 4.5 investigates the intermediate case of independent affinities. The latter section illustrates the difficulty of characterizing the bundle's adoption under general correlation and motivates the model of Section 5, wherein user affinities for the services are captured through correlated discrete (Bernoulli) random variables with parameterized correlation. Section 6 articulates the findings that emerge from the analysis and numerically explores their robustness through limited extensions to the model. Section 7 offers a brief conclusion.
RELATED WORK
The topic of this article is at the intersection of two major lines of work: product and technology diffusion and product and service bundling.
Modeling how products and services diffuse through a population of potential users, that is, are being adopted, is a topic of longstanding interest in marketing research, with Peres et al. [2010] offering a recent review of available models and techniques. The models most relevant to our investigation are those based on the approach introduced by Cabral [1990] and extended in many subsequent works, which explore product diffusion in the presence of externalities using an adoption decision process that reflects the utility of individual users. As described in Section 3, the adoption model we rely on belongs to this line of work. However, and except for a few recent works that we review shortly, the aspect of bundling had not been incorporated in these investigations. This is one of the aspects we focus on in the article.
There has obviously been a significant literature devoted to bundling as a standalone topic (see Venkatesh and Mahajan [2009] for a recent review). The main goal of most of those works has typically been the development of optimal bundling and pricing strategies; and pricing is a dimension largely absent from our investigation in that service costs 5 are assumed given and exogenous. We acknowledge, however, that there may be scenarios where pricing can be a design parameter towards maximizing adoption, such as through the introduction of incentives. Developing models that include such an extension is clearly of interest, but outside this article's scope. Our focus is instead on how the joint distribution in service valuation across users (as measured through their correlation coefficient) determines whether the adoption level of a service bundle can exceed those of separate service offerings. Correlation in how users value different services and the impact this has on bundling strategies is in itself a topic that several prior works have explicitly taken into account, for example, Schmalensee [1984] , McAfee et al. [1989] , and Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1999] . In general, negative correlation in demand improves bundling's benefits over separate offerings, although high marginal costs (compared to the average value of the bundle) can negate this effect. Conversely, a high positive correlation tends to yield the opposite outcome, that is, favor separate (pure component) offerings. As highlighted in the examples of Section 1, our focus on maximizing adoption results in more nuanced outcomes, with correlation playing a more ambivalent role in determining the success of a bundled offering. Furthermore, early works on bundling did not account for the potential impact of externalities.
There are to-date only three works we are aware of [Prasad et al. 2010; Pang and Etzion 2012; Chao and Derdenger 2013] that have investigated the problem of bundling products or services with externalities; we briefly review how these papers differ from our investigation. First and, as has been the norm in the bundling literature, the preceding three papers all focus on optimal pricing strategies, while we assume that costs (prices) are exogenous parameters and instead seek to understand their impact (and that of other factors) on the adoption level of a bundled offering. Second, the impact of value (demand) correlation is essentially absent from these three prior works.
Specifically, Prasad et al. [2010] focus on optimal pricing while assuming independent valuations for the two services. Pang and Etzion [2012] explore the joint offering of a product and a complementary service, where the latter exhibits positive externalities. As in Prasad et al. [2010] , users' valuations for the product and its complementary service are assumed independent and there is no investigation of the potential impact of their correlation. Chao and Derdenger [2013] cast their work in the context of a twosided market (the two market sides create externalities), where the platform provider seeks to decide how to bundle and price new content with the platform it offers, given the existence of an installed base of users and content developers. The focus is again on optimal pricing strategies and bundling decisions and there is no correlation between the value of the new content and that of earlier content. We reiterate that these are important differences with our work, which, furthermore, does not involve the presence of an existing user base. As Chao and Derdenger's [2013] title indicates and as the paper emphasizes [Chao and Derdenger 2013, Section 2.2] , this plays an important role in the platform's strategic decisions. In contrast, our interest lies primarily in understanding how bundling can help nascent Internet services ultimately reach the high levels of adoption they need to realize their full value potential and succeed.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this section, we review the basic structure of the models on which we rely to capture the evolution of service adoption.
Separate (Unbundled) Service Offerings
We consider a model for the adoption of multiple (two) services by a heterogeneous population of potential users. The perceived utility V i (x i (t)) of service i ∈ {1, 2} by a (random) user, given that a fraction x i (t) ∈ [0, 1] of the population has adopted the service at time t, incorporates three components: (i) the user's affinity (standalone value) for the service (capturing users' heterogeneity); (ii) the network externality tied to the adoption level of the service; and (iii) the service cost. Specifically,
where: (i) U i ≥ 0 is the user's (random) affinity for service i; (ii) e i ≥ 0 is the strength of the externality contribution for service i; and (iii) c i ≥ 0 is the cost of adopting service i. As is common, for analytical tractability we adopt a linear externality model 6 . When services are offered separately, users make adoption decisions for each based on their respective utilities. user adopts service i at time t with adoption level
In particular, there is no "budget constraint" where adoption of one service by a user affects adoption of the other service by this same user; this is natural, given our focus on adoption costs, such as communication, storage, processing, etc., rather than pricing. However, while service adoption decisions are uncoupled, the random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) capturing heterogeneity in user affinity may be correlated.
Denote as h i (x i ) = P(V i (x i ) > 0) the probability a random user adopts service i given an adoption level x i . An equilibrium for this model is any
When the two services are offered separately, they achieve adoption equilibria (x * 1 , x * 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]. One of our goals is to compare these equilibria to those realized when the two services are bundled and to characterize these differences as a function of the model's parameters (e 1 , e 2 , c 1 , c 2 ) and the joint distribution of (U 1 , U 2 ).
Bundled Service Offerings
Under bundling, a user must decide whether to adopt either both services or neither, that is, we do not consider the case of mixed bundling where services are simultaneously offered separately and as a bundle. The basis for a user's decision is now the aggregate utility she derives from the bundle user adopts the bundle at time t ⇔ V (x(t)) > 0, where, consistent with Eq. (1),
Here, x(t) is the (common) adoption level of the bundled services. Note the assumption of additive values for the two services, namely V (x(t)) = V 1 (x(t)) + V 2 (x(t)), implying that they are neither substitutes nor complements. Under this assumption, U = U 1 + U 2 is the aggregate intrinsic value of the bundled services, e = e 1 + e 2 is the aggregate force of the externality, and c is the aggregate cost that, for simplicity, also satisfies c = c 1 + c 2 . Extending the model to account for instances where the two services are partial complements or substitutes, as well as for possible economies of scope in the cost of a service bundle, is clearly of interest. Such extensions can be readily incorporated into the models, but add complexity. Furthermore, while they quantitatively affect adoption outcomes, that is, if and when bundling is beneficial, the qualitative findings of the article still hold, in particular the importance of the joint distribution (correlation) of service affinities in the efficacy of bundling. As with separate offerings, equilibria satisfy
Our question can now be restated more formally: How do adoption equilibria (x * , x * ) under bundling compare with adoption equilibria (x * 1 , x * 2 ) when services are separately offered?
It remains to specify the joint distribution of service affinities (values a user assigns to each service) (U 1 , U 2 ). In Section 4 we consider the case where (U 1 , U 2 ) are uniform continuous random variables, while in Section 5 we assume that (U 1 , U 2 ) are uniform discrete (Bernoulli) random variables. Table I lists commonly used notation.
CONTINUOUS AFFINITIES
In this section, we assume (U 1 , U 2 ) are continuous uniform random variables on [0, 1]. This assumption is sufficient to characterize the equilibria under separate service offerings, as we do in Section 4.1. The equilibria under bundled service offerings, however, depend upon the correlation between (U 1 , U 2 ), since the bundled affinity depends upon U = U 1 + U 2 . A distribution on (U 1 , U 2 ) with a parameterized correlation is presented Table I . Notation
x i (t) adoption level of (unbundled) service i at time t x(t) adoption level of service bundle at time t x * i , x * equilibria adoption level for service i and bundle (U 1 , U 2 ) random (unbundled) service affinities U = U 1 + U 2 affinity for service bundle (e 1 , e 2 ) externality for (unbundled) services 1, 2 e = e 1 + e 2 externality for service bundle (c 1 , c 2 ) costs for adopting (unbundled) services 1, 2 c = c 1 + c 2 costs for adopting service bundle (V 1 , V 2 ) utility function for (unbundled) services 1, 2 correlation parameter for (U 1 , U 2 ) in (18) p distribution parameter for (U 1 , U 2 ) in (5) n population size for Monte-Carlo simulations in Section 4.2, but is difficult to work with in its general form 7 . Consequently, we investigate the three special cases where (U 1 , U 2 ) are perfectly positively (Section 4.3) and negatively (Section 4.4) correlated, and independent (Section 4.5). The intent is to illustrate that different types of outcomes arise at the two correlation extremes and to confirm the difficulties associated with capturing the impact of intermediate correlation values when using continuous distributions. We also investigate in the appendix a joint distribution based on copulas. It includes independent affinities as a special case and further highlights the difficulty of capturing the impact of correlation in the general case. These difficulties motivate the more tractable discrete model of Section 5, wherein we are able to more explicitly explore the impact of varying correlation. Numerical investigations are then used in Section 6.2 to verify that findings obtained with the simpler discrete model also hold under the continuous one.
Separate Offerings
The following proposition characterizes the possible equilibria for separate service offerings when the user service affinities are uniform random variables.
for adoption thresholds l i ≡ c i −1 e i and r i ≡ c i e i . The three possible equilibria are x * i ∈ {0, (1 − c i )/(1 − e i ), 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are
The proof of Proposition 4.1 is straightforward and omitted. Note that the equilibria conditions are a cover but not a partition of the (c i , e i ) plane, while the lseq. conditions are a partition of the (c i , e i ) plane (see Figure 6 in the appendix for an illustration). Note also that the notion of lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) is natural in our setting, where we consider services that have an initial adoption level of 0 when first offered, namely x i (0) = 0, so that the lseq. will be the achieved equilibrium. The conditions on the equilibria are also intuitive: zero adoption results when the costs are high, full adoption results when the externality effect outweighs the cost, and partial adoption results when costs are low but outweigh the externality effect.
Bundling under General Correlation
The equilibria under bundled service offerings with continuous uniform affinities (U 1 , U 2 ) depend upon the correlation between them. There are many ways to generate random variables with parametrized correlation. We rely on a standard approach [Pearson 1907; Hotelling and Pabst 1936] (see the appendix, Section A.1 for details) to generate a pair of uniform random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) with correlation coefficient ρ for any value ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. The approach uses a pair of independent standard normal random variables as its starting point, so that the joint distribution F U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ), the distribution of the aggregate service affinity F U (u) for U = U 1 +U 2 , and the resulting probability of adoption h(x) can all be described in terms of the standard normal CDF F Z .
As seen in the appendix, the resulting expressions are in general rather unwieldy; for illustration purposes, we restate next the expression for h(x) that can be used to determine adoption equilibria as
for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2 e , m ≡ c−1 e , and r ≡ c e . The equilibria under bundling are the solutions of h(x) = x. As evident from Eq. (6), this is a difficult equation to work with, thereby motivating to focus on the three specific cases of perfect positive (U 1 = U 2 ) and negative (U 1 = 1 − U 2 ) correlation, as well as independence, namely ρ ∈ {−1, 0, +1}.
Perfect Positive Correlation
Specializing for ρ = 1 in Propositions A.4 and A.6 of the appendix yields the joint and sum distributions for uniform random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) satisfying U 1 = U 2 , and thus U = U 1 + U 2 is uniform over [0, 2] .
Because the aggregate affinity is uniformly distributed on [0, 2], the resulting equilibria are of the same form as in Proposition 4.1 after replacing e i and c i by e/2 and c/2, respectively. Thus we have the following corollary to Propositions A.8 and 4.1.
COROLLARY 4.2. The probability of bundle adoption h(x) in Proposition A.8 under aggregate affinity U = U 1 + U 2 formed from perfectly positively correlated uniform
The three possible equilibria are x * ∈ {0,
The next part of the analysis is to compare the lowest stable equilibria under separate ((x * 1 , x * 2 )) and bundled ((x * , x * )) offerings as a function of the system parameters (e 1 , e 2 , c 1 , c 2 ). The results are shown next.
The nine rows are lowest stable equilibria (x * 1 , x * 2 ) under separate offerings, with
The third column corresponds to the lowest stable equilibria (x * , x * ) under bundling with x * ∈ {0, (2 − c)/(2 − e), 1}. Each combination of row and third column entry, say (x * 1 , x * 2 , x * ), is a possible equilibrium triple without and with bundling. The second column gives the conditions on (c 1 , c 2 , e 1 , e 2 ) for each (x * 1 , x * 2 ) to be the lowest stable equilibria under separate offerings, while the second row of the third column gives the conditions on (c, e) for each x * to be the lowest stable equilibria under bundling.
Each third column entry is labeled with a pair of letters ( 1 , 2 ) with i ∈ {L, S, W} for i ∈ {1, 2} representing (L)ose, (S)ame, and (W)in and denoting the change in equilibrium under bundling for that service. For example, SL means the equilibrium for service 1 stayed the same (x * 1 = x * ), while the equilibrium for service 2 decreased (x * 2 > x * ). The notation a ∧ b in the inequalities in the second column simply means that the inequality needs to be satisfied for both a "AND" b. The word "True" indicates the equilibrium for the column always results for the equilibria in the corresponding row, for example, when c 1 > 1 and c 2 > 1, the bundled equilibrium 0 always results for the separate equilibria (0, 0) because the conditions on c 1 and c 2 imply c > 2. Conversely, the word "False" indicates the equilibrium for the column is never feasible for the equilibria in the corresponding row.
There are nine possible tuples. Under perfectly positively correlated user valuations, the bundle's valuation is essentially a weighted sum of the valuations of the individual services, so that most outcomes involve a trade-off between improving (or maintaining) the adoption of one service and worsening (or maintaining) that of the other. Of note is the fact that an LL outcome is not feasible. This is because a bundle equilibrium of 0 only arises when the less valuable service also has an equilibrium of 0 when offered alone, resulting in an SL (or LS) outcome. Because of the effect of externalities, the converse is, however, not true, that is, W W outcomes can be realized.
W W outcomes typically arise when one technology has a high adoption cost together with a high externality factor, while the other enjoys middling cost and externality factor. In such cases, the first technology could be tremendously successful if only it could have managed to acquire enough of a user base to unleash the value that its strong externality factor can deliver, however, its high adoption cost makes this nearly impossible. Hence, when offered alone, this technology never takes off. In contrast, the relatively low adoption cost of the other technology enables it to make rapid initial progress even when offered alone. Its initial adoption spurt, however, quickly subsides as its externality contributions do not progress fast enough to keep attracting more users. This translates in neither technology experiencing meaningful success when offered alone. Bundling can change this.
When the two technologies are bundled, the second becomes the engine that drives initial adoption until a sufficient user base has been built soas to allow the first technology to cross its critical adoption threshold. At this point, the roles reverse and the first technology becomes the main driver for continued adoption, as its strong externality contribution now suffices to attract more users. The bundle's adoption then takes off, possibly reaching full penetration. In the process, the second technology also reaches a level of adoption it would never have realized on its own.
Perfect Negative Correlation
Specializing for ρ = −1 in Propositions A.4 and A.6 of the appendix yields the joint and sum distributions for uniform random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) satisfying U = U 1 +U 2 = 1 as
The case of perfect negative correlation is simpler to analyze than that of perfect positive correlation. All users now see the same utility of 1 + ex − c for the bundle. The following corollary of Proposition A.8 shows that when c < 1 all users immediately adopt, while seeding to an adoption level of x = c − 1 is needed to ensure full adoption when e > c − 1 and adoption is never feasible when e < c − 1. 
The two possible equilibria (eq.) are x * ∈ {0, 1}, with conditions for each.
We next compare the lowest stable equilibria both without ((x * 1 , x * 2 )) and with ((x * , x * )) bundling as a function of the system parameters (e 1 , e 2 , c 1 , c 2 ). In general, under perfect negative correlation, the overall cost of the bundle is the dominant factor in determining whether bundling is beneficial. As shown next, this yields very different outcomes when compared to the case of perfect positive correlation.
First, seven rather than eight of the nine equilibrium-change pairs ( 1 , 2 ) are possible. The two missing entries are W L and LW (as opposed to LL for perfect positive correlation), that is, it is not possible for the adoption levels of the two services to simultaneously increase and decrease, respectively. Second, if either equilibrium under separate offerings is zero then the bundled equilibrium is zero, that is, both services must be individually viable for a bundled offering to succeed. Again, this is unlike the perfect positive correlation case wherein pairing a service that was not viable on its own with a more successful one can result in a nonzero adoption for the bundle (and even in some cases in a W W outcome). Third, when both equilibria under separate offerings are nonzero, the bundled equilibria may be better than or equal to both equilibria, or may be worse than or equal to both. For example, the separate offering equilibria pair (x * 1 , x * 2 ) = ((1 − c 1 )/(1 − e 1 ), (1 − c 2 )/(1 − e 2 )) (that requires e 1 < c 1 < 1 and e 2 < c 2 < 1) may yield a bundled equilibria of (0, 0) if c > 1, or (1, 1) if c < 1. In the case of perfect positive correlation, the bundle equilibrium is always at some intermediate value between the two standalone equilibria.
The next section considers the intermediate configuration of independent affinities in an attempt to explore when and how changes occur between these two extremes.
Independent Affinities
Specialization for ρ = 0 of Propositions A.4 and A.6 in the appendix yields the joint and sum distributions for independent uniform random variables
This yields the following corollary to Proposition A.8 of the appendix.
COROLLARY 4.4. Under aggregate affinity U formed from independent uniform affini-
which is convex increasing on l < x ≤ m and concave increasing on m < x ≤ r (recall h(m) = 1/2). Besides x * ∈ {0, 1}, the possible equilibria in (0, 1) are
The regions on the (c, e) plane where these equilibria exist are
PROOF. The first two derivatives of h(x) are
The equilibria are the solutions of h(x) = x, that is,
The solutions are given by Eq. (10). An explicit comparison of the equilibria with and without bundling as in the two previous sections appears complicated. Without bundling, the equilibria (x * 1 , x * 2 ) are such that x * i depends upon (c i , e i ) as in Proposition 4.1. With bundling, the equilibria (x * , x * ) is such that x * depends upon (c, e) (where c = c 1 + c 2 and e = e 1 + e 2 ) as in Corollary 4.4. Figure 8 in the appendix illustrates the complex shapes of the bundled equilibria regions even in this relatively simple case of independent affinities. Section A.4 in the appendix outlines a more general approach to systematically exploring the impact of correlation through the use of copulas. Unfortunately, and as the results of this section for the special case of independent affinities already suggest, explicitly characterizing adoption equilibria under a copula approach proves difficult.
Summary
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 hint at a transition in the impact of correlation on bundling. Sections 4.5 and A.4 unfortunately illustrate that, while a direct analysis is feasible, it is cumbersome, which makes extracting insight into when bundling can improve adoption challenging. As a result, the next section introduces a discrete affinity model that preserves users' heterogeneity, but allows us to explicitly explore the impact of correlation. Section 6.2 assesses through numerical investigations the robustness of the results obtained using this simplified discrete model and, in particular, that much of the insight emerging from this simpler model also holds under continuous affinities.
DISCRETE AFFINITIES
In this section, we model user affinities as a pair of Bernoulli random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 with joint distribution parameterized by p ∈ [0, 1].
The user population consists of four types, namely negative affinities for both services (0, 0), positive affinities for both services (1, 1), and mixed service affinities (0, 1) and (1, 0). Note the marginals are independent of the parameter p and are in fact uniform, that is, P(U 1 = 1) = P(U 2 = 1) = 1/2. Thus, exactly half of the population has a positive affinity for each service, regardless of p. Although the discrete model is a simplification of the continuous one of Section 4, it facilitates study of the impact of correlation in user service affinities. The correlation between (U 1 , U 2 ) is
which ranges from ρ = −1 for p = 1 (all users have mixed affinities, p 01 = p 10 = 1/2) up to ρ = +1 for p = 0 (all users' affinities are either both positive or both negative, p 00 = p 11 = 1/2).
Separate Offerings
The probability of a user adopting service i ∈ {1, 2} under separate service offerings and the resulting equilibria are given in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5.1. When U i is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, the probability of user adoption of service i in Eq. (2) becomes
for adoption thresholds l i ≡ c i −1 e i and r i ≡ c i e i . The three possible equilibria are x * i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is straightforward and omitted. All seven nonempty subsets of {0, 1/2, 1} may coexist as equilibria and all equilibria are stable. If costs are high (c i ≥ 1), then no adoption is possible; likewise, if the externality is high (e i ≥ c i ), then full adoption is possible. Intermediate-level (x * i = 1/2) adoption is possible for externalities that are moderate with respect to the cost.
Bundled Offerings
The probability of a user adopting a bundled service offering and the resulting equilibria are given in the following proposition. 
for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2 e , m ≡ c−1 e , r ≡ c e . The four possible equilibria are x * ∈ {0, (1 + ρ)/4, (3 − ρ)/4, 1}. The conditions for each equilibrium (eq.) are
The lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) adoption level for each (c i , e i ) is
PROOF. Conditioning on (U 1 , U 2 ) gives the user adoption probability as follows.
The characterization of the equilibria and the lseq. are straightforward and omitted.
Remark 5.3. Observe the lseq.
(1 + ρ)/4 in (15) does not exist for c < 1, and the lseq. (3 − ρ)/4 may or may not exist for all (c, e, ρ) tuples since the "lower" threshold 4(c−1)/(1+ρ) on e may in fact be smaller or larger than the "upper" threshold 4c/(3−ρ). Further, observe that the lseq. conditions in (15) may be rewritten in terms of ρ as
In this form, one can observe the sharp discontinuities of the lseq. viewed as a function of ρ. For example, when c = e = 1, the preceding equation becomes x * = 1 for ρ < −1 (vacuous), x * = 0 for ρ ≤ −1 (i.e., ρ = −1), and x * = (3−ρ)/4 for ρ ∈ (−1, 1]. Viewed as a function of ρ, the lseq. starts at x * = 0 for ρ = −1, jumps to x * = 1 for ρ = −1 + , > 0, then falls off in ρ as (3 − ρ)/4 down to x * = 1/2 at ρ = 1. As detailed in Section 6, while such changes are in part due to the discretized nature of users' affinities for the two services, they also map to intuitive explanations. For instance, the jump in adoption from x * = 0 to x * = 1 when ρ goes from −1 to −1 + for c = e = 1 is caused by the emergence of a small set of users with high affinity for both services. This creates a set of early adopters sufficient to trigger an adoption cascade to full adoption (the externality factor e is relatively low, but so is the overall cost c). Conversely, while increasing ρ further facilitates initial adoption, it also introduces a growing set of users with low affinity for both services that, in this scenario of low externality (e = 1), ultimately results in a lower final adoption level.
More generally and as with separate offerings, no adoption is possible if costs are high (c ≥ 2), and full adoption is possible if the externality is high (e ≥ c). The intermediate equilibria (1 + ρ)/4, (3 − ρ)/4 are possible when the externality is moderate with respect to the cost. Of interest is identifying regions where bundling yields a higher adoption equilibirium, namely W W scenarios, and in particular how this outcome may be affected by ρ. Exploring this issue is the topic of Section 5.3.
Bundling's Impact on Equilibria
There are 3 × 3 × 4 = 36 possible lseq. combinations ((x * 1 , x * 2 ), x * ), where (x * 1 , x * 2 ) is the separate offering lowest equilibria and x * the bundling lowest equilibrium. The table of Figure 1 lists all 36 combinations and identifies those conditions under which each holds and whether bundling is beneficial or not. As in Section 4, equilibria under separate offerings form the rows, while the four equilibria under bundling form the (leftmost) columns. The row headings (second column) give the requirements on (c 1 , c 2 , e 1 , e 2 ) for a particular pair of separate offering lower equilibria. The column headings (second row) give the requirements on (c, e, ρ) for a particular bundled equilibrium to be the lowest equilibrium.
Individual entries in the table identify how bundled equilibria compare to equilibria under separate offerings, that is, as before, a Win (W), a Loss (L), or the Same (S), and whether individual combinations are feasible (True) or not (False). Note that, in several instances, row and column conditions are redundant, for instance, c 1 > 1 and c 2 > 1 obviously imply c > 2, so that simplifications are possible. For clarity of presentation, we omit specifying these more compact requirements in the table.
Several observations follow from the table, in particular how ρ affects the emergence of W W combinations. Of note is that those configurations yielding W W outcomes are qualitatively consistent with those of Section 4.3 (e.g., combining a low-cost, lowexternality technology with a high-cost, high-externality one can improve adoption for both). The table, however, also reveals a more ambivalent role for ρ than the two extreme configurations of Sections 4.3 and 4.4 seemed to indicate. In particular, consider the conditions (1+ρ)e > 4(c −1) and (3−ρ)e > 4c that are required to hold for 1 to be an equilibrium under bundling. Increasing (decreasing) ρ makes it easier (harder) for the first condition to be met, but is clearly detrimental (beneficial) to the second. Similarly, varying ρ can also allow the emergence of W W scenarios present in Section 4.4 but not 4.3, that is, combining two middling technologies, (x * 1 , x * 2 ) = (1/2, 1/2), can benefit both under certain conditions. The next section investigates this more extensively.
Other observations are also possible from the table, and we summarize next some of the more relevant ones. First, if (0, 0) is the separate offering equilibrium then 0 is the bundled equilibrium, that is, bundling cannot help. This is because c 1 > 1 and c 2 > 1 imply c > 2. Second, if (1, 1) is the separate offering equilibrium, then it is possible for the bundled equilibrium to be (1 + ρ)/4, that is, bundling can result in an LL outcome. Third, if the separate offering equilibria are both nonzero, then bundling cannot cause the equilibrium to drop to zero, but can cause it to drop (to (1 + ρ)/4, which can be made arbitrarily close to 0). This happens when (1 + ρ)e < 4(c − 1), namely when the bundle cost is relatively large (c > 1) and when the correlation coefficient ρ is small enough. Fourth, if the separate offering equilibria are both below one but at least one is nonzero, then bundling can increase the equilibrium to (3 − ρ)/4 or 1, provided the bundle's cost is not too high (c < 2). For example, when the separate offering equilibria are (0, 1/2), the bundled offering equilibrium is either (3 − ρ)/4 or 1, provided c < 2 and (1 + ρ)e > 4(c − 1). In the next section, we further explore the impact of ρ on the potential benefits that bundling can yield.
The following proposition summarizes the previous discussions and, in particular, the regimes for which bundling leads to win-win (WW) or lose-lose (LL) equilibria relative to separate offerings under discrete affinities.
PROPOSITION 5.4. Under discrete uniform affinities, the lowest stable equilibrium (lseq.) under bundling is better than both of the corresponding adoption levels when the services are offered separately (i.e., a win-win scenario) when either of the following is true:
The first scenario bundles a relatively low-cost, low-externality service with a highcost, high-externality one. The first service bootstraps early adoption if affinity correlation is high enough to ensure that some users see value in both services even at low adoption. The second service then pushes adoption of the bundle higher once the added externality value it contributes reaches critical mass.
The second scenario combines two relatively low-cost and low-externality services. A high correlation in service affinities can help the bundle value reach sufficient critical mass so that its total value exceeds its cost for more users than if services were separately offered.
The lseq. under bundling is worse than both of the corresponding adoption levels when the services are offered separately (i.e., a lose-lose scenario) when the following is true:
(1) separate equilibria (x * 1 , x * 2 ) ∈ {(1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1), (1, 1/2), (1, 1)}, i.e., , c 1 < 1 and c 2 < 1 (implies c < 2); bundled equilibria x * < 1/2: ρ ≤ 4(c − 1)/e − 1.
The preceding conditions state that, in general, when affinity correlation for two bundled services is low enough, the value of the bundle remains below its (higher) cost for a larger fraction of users than if the services were offered separately.
GUIDELINES AND INTERPRETATIONS
The traditional wisdom in developing bundling strategies (e.g., see Venkatesh and Mahajan [2009] ) is that bundling is typically most effective in the presence of negative correlation in user valuations (reservation prices). The intuition is that bundling reduces heterogeneity in users' valuations, thereby facilitating the selection of a "price" for a bundled offering that results in an overall higher profit (see Venkatesh and Mahajan [2009, Section 2.3] ).
There are obviously differences between the profit maximization goal of traditional bundling strategies and ours of maximizing adoption given a fixed adoption cost that will typically be different from the price that would optimize profit 8 . The other important difference between our formulation and that of traditional bundling strategies is the presence of externalities. Hence, we can expect both factors to contribute to possible differences in outcomes, with the latter (presence of externalities) likely to have a stronger influence.
In particular, it is relatively easy to see from Eqs. (1) and (3) that, without externalities, assessing whether bundling benefits adoption is straightforward. Specifically, when services are offered separately, adoption levels are simply equal to 1 − F 1 (c 1 ) and 1 − F 2 (c 2 ), where F i (x) is the CDF of users' valuation for service i. Conversely, the adoption level of the bundle is given by 1 − F(c 1 + c 2 ), where F(x) is the CDF of the random variable U = U 1 + U 2 that captures the cumulative valuation of the two services to a (random) user). Hence, in the absence of externalities, whether bundling is beneficial (improves overall adoption) or not is solely a function of how the bundle's cost compares to the cost of individual services.
On the other hand, as the models of both Sections 4 and 5 revealed, more complex behaviors emerge when externalities are present. In particular, the models revealed that W W outcomes can arise under two general scenarios. The first involves bundling a service with a high externality factor and a high adoption cost with a second service that enjoys middling cost and externality factor. Alternatively, W W outcomes may also arise from bundling two middling services that alone cannot create sufficient externality value to reach a high level of adoption, but which together could. In both cases, correlation (ρ) in how individual users value the services can affect the outcome.
On the Role of Correlation (Discrete Model)
The impact of ρ is illustrated in Figure 2 that plots as a function of ρ ∈ [−1, 1] the adoption level of a technology bundle for different scenarios under the discrete correlation model of Section 5.
The top row of Figure 2 displays adoption levels when bundling two heterogeneous technologies. Technology 1 has a high cost, c 1 = 4/3, that prevents it from taking off on its own, namely its standalone adoption remains at x * 1 = 0, irrespective of its externality factor e 1 . Technology 2 has a low cost, c 2 = 1/3, but marginal externality, e 2 = 1/3, so that x * 2 = 1/2. Combining the two technologies can benefit both, but only when the externality e 1 of technology 1 is high enough, namely e 1 ≥ 5/3 (three rightmost plots). When e 1 is low, that is, e 1 ≤ 1, technology 1 still benefits from being bundled with technology 2 (because of the relative lower cost of the bundle), but the reverse is not true (x * ≤ 1/2). More interesting, though, than the impact of e 1 in creating a W W outcome is the role of ρ. Specifically, when e 1 is large enough, the benefits of bundling arise only once ρ exceeds a certain threshold. This is because early adopters of the bundle are driven primarily by the second technology and, under highly negative correlation in technology valuations, the first technology contributes added cost but little or no added value to those early adopters. Hence, adoption stops quickly at a level below that of the second technology offered alone. As correlation increases, the number of early adopters that derive positive utility from adopting the bundle increases to a point where adoption can reach enough of a critical mass to allow the externality effect of the first technology to become effective. This cross-over threshold is partially responsible for the discontinuities seen in Figure 2 . As alluded to in Section 5.2, once correlation becomes high enough to allow the formation of a critical mass of early adopters, this can then carry adoption past a level where the high externality of the second technology becomes sufficient to move the bundle's adoption to the next (discrete) adoption level. In other words, this allows adoption to increase beyond what the second technology alone would have realized.
Note, though, that further increases in correlation need not yield additional improvements. As a matter of fact and as again alluded to in Section 5.2, increasing ρ beyond the threshold can lower adoption (top row, second plot from the left, e 1 = 5/3). This is because, as correlation increases, the potential adoption "base" of the bundle narrows (both technologies appeal to an increasingly similar set of users), which limits the adoption equilibrium that can be reached. This effect persists until the externality factor of technology 1 is strong enough to allow the bundle to reach full adoption (third and fourth plots from the left for e 1 = 7/3, 3). As the externality factor of technology 1 continues increasing, its strength becomes sufficient to preserve full adoption for some range of ρ beyond the initial threshold. Further increases of ρ outside this range can, however, result in the adoption level of the bundle dropping again (third plot from the left, e 1 = 7/3). This is again only avoided after the externality factor of the first technology is strong enough that the range of ρ values for which no decline in the bundle's adoption occurs will extend all the way to ρ = 1 (rightmost plot for e 1 = 3).
Conversely, the middle row of Figure 2 considers the bundling of two middling technologies that alone only realize a relatively low adoption level x * 1 = x * 2 = 1/2. They both have reasonably low costs, c 1 = 3/4, c 2 = 1/2, and can benefit from bundling when their combined externality factor e = e 1 + e 2 is high enough. The four plots display (left to right) adoption as a function of ρ and for increasing values of e (e 2 = 3/4 and e 1 varies from 0 to 3/2). They offer a qualitatively similar behavior, including discontinuities as in the upper row of Figure 2 , albeit with a more limited range, for instance, W L outcomes can be eliminated (if ρ is high enough) and the decreases in adoption as ρ keeps increasing cannot be avoided. This is not unexpected since the constraint that x * 1 = x * 2 = 1/2 limits the range of costs and externality factors permissible. Whereas the top and middle rows of Figure 2 illustrate win-win scenarios, the bottom row illustrates a lose-lose scenario, where the adoption level under bundling x * can be less than the adoption levels of both services under separate offerings (x * 1 , x * 2 ). In particular, we consider c 1 = 3/4, e 1 = 3/2, and e 2 = 11/6, with c 2 ∈ {13/36, 1/2, 19/28, 11/12}. Note that in all cases c i < 1 and e i > 2c i for i ∈ {1, 2} and thus, as shown by the last row in Figure 1 , x * 1 = x * 2 = 1 for all four values of c 2 . Furthermore, c 1 < 1 and c 2 < 1 imply c < 2. As the bundled equilibria x * = 0 and x * = (3 − ρ)/4 are not possible for this pair of separate equilibria, it remains to determine whether x * = (1 + ρ)/4 or x * = 1. The distinction depends upon whether or not (1 + ρ)e ≷ 4(c − 1), viewed as a function of ρ, the solution of which gives the locations of the discontinuities shown in the figure at ρ * ≈ {−0.87, −0.70, −0.49, −0.20}, respectively. In fact, since e > 2c is implied by e i > 2c i , it follows that the discontinuity cannot occur at any ρ > 0. Thus, bundling can only produce a lose-lose outcome relative to separate offerings when the service affinities are sufficiently negatively correlated. When ρ = −1 the population is divided into two equal-sized halves, each with an affinity for one of the two services. The costs are sufficently low and the externalities sufficiently high for each of these two subpopulations to achieve full adoption. But under bundling at ρ = −1 there are no individuals with an affinity for both services (U = 2), which is required for the net utility to be positive, namely V = U − c > 0, and as such the bundled service finds an equilibrium at zero. As ρ increases, however, there is a small population of users with affinity for both services and, as in the scenarios of the first two rows, these individuals are now able to "jump-start" the bundled service.
In the next section, we explore the extent to which the prior conclusions remain qualitatively valid under the more general model of continuous affinities of Section 4.
On the Role of Correlation (Continuous Model)
The discrete affinity model of Section 5 let us explicitly account for the impact of correlation when bundling services. Its relative simplicity, however, raises the question of whether the findings hold under more general (realistic) assumptions. An exhaustive assessment is clearly impractical, so we limit ourselves to the uniform distribution of Section 4 to offer initial evidence of the robustness of the results. Because, as mentioned in Section 4.5, an analytical investigation of uniformly distributed affinities under general correlation is complex, we resort to a numerical approach. Specifically, we consider a pair of bundling scenarios similar to those of Figure 2 and numerically evaluate the bundle's adoption for different values of ρ. The results are reported in Figure 3 , which largely mirrors Figure 2 with some differences, as we briefly review.
The three sets of plots in Figure 3 clearly display the presence of a threshold effect, where correlation (ρ) needs to exceed a certain minimum value before bundling becomes beneficial. This is particularly so when combining two heterogeneous services: a highcost, high-externality one with a low-cost, low-externality one (top row). Unlike the corresponding scenario in Figure 2 , the jump in the bundle's adoption that occurs after crossing the threshold is not followed by a decline in adoption as ρ further increases. This is likely because, under a uniform distribution, the relative value of the externality after crossing the threshold is sufficient to prevent declines in adoption for larger values of ρ, namely a scenario similar to that of the top rightmost plot of Figure 2 . The potentially negative impact of further increases in ρ (beyond the threshold) is, however, seen in the middle row of the plots of Figure 3 . In particular, the rightmost plot clearly displays that, while ρ needs to exceed a threshold value of about −0.4 for the bundle to jump to full adoption (x * = 1), increasing ρ beyond this value results in progressively lower adoptions levels.
We note that the middle scenario is an instance of an SW rather than a true W W scenario and, under continuous affinity distributions, we did not identify instances of true W W outcomes that exhibited a decline in adoption as ρ increased beyond its threshold value. This is not unexpected since, as mentioned earlier, the shape of the joint distribution and not just the correlation coefficient is expected to affect the outcome. Hence, as distributions change, so will the exact configurations under which different effects arise, as well as their magnitude. However, we believe that the general insight articulated in the previous section still holds, namely that the presence of a minimum correlation value to realize the critical mass of early adopters that a bundle with a high externality factor needs to succeed and the fact that increasing ρ beyond this value can narrow the bundle's ultimate user base and therefore lower overall adoption unless its externality factor is large enough. Discontinuities were also present, that correspond to the emergence of a sufficient critical mass of adopters so that the externality value can build up to allow adoption to "jump" to the next higher equilibrium.
The bottom row of the plots in Figure 3 illustrates a lose-lose scenario under continuous affinities, analogous to the bottom row in Figure 2 . In particular, we consider c 1 = 3/4, e 1 = 3/4, and e 2 = 11/12, with c 2 ∈ {8/12, 9/12, 10/12, 11/12}. Note that in all cases c i < 1 and thus, by Proposition 4.1, x * 1 = x * 2 = 1 for all four values of c 2 . As with the analogous discrete affinities scenario, bundling is lose-lose relative to separate offerings only when the correlation is sufficiently negative. As the cost c 2 increases from 8/12 to 11/12, there is a corresponding increase in the critical threshold correlation level at which the bundled equilibrium transitions from 0 to 1. The same intuition provided for the discrete affinities case holds here as well.
Summary
Based on the aforesaid results and partially restating those articulated in Proposition 5.4, the following bundling guidelines emerge to assist in identifying services that, if bundled, can result in W W outcomes. Bundling guidelines. When bundling network services so as to bolster their adoption, it is best to choose services that are:
(1) (a) either heterogeneous in their cost-benefit structure, that is, low cost and externality versus high cost and externality; or (b) of average cost and externality;
(2) and sufficiently correlated in how users value them, but not too much.
The first guideline highlights the fact that successful bundling outcomes require both a high overall externality factor and a low enough cost to allow the creation of a sufficient critical mass of early adopters, so that the value of the high externality can start being realized. The second guideline states that creating a sufficient critical mass of early adopters requires a certain minimum level of correlation in how users value the bundled services, but that, once this level has been reached, there is no benefit in selecting services exhibiting higher levels of correlation (and there could be disadvantages).
CONCLUSION
The article presents an initial investigation aimed at developing a better understanding of when bundling networking technologies or services can be beneficial, namely result in higher adoption levels than when they are separately offered.
The question is of relevance in many practical settings as networking technologies commonly face early adoption hurdles until they acquire a large enough user base to start delivering sufficient value. Bundling technologies can offer an effective solution to overcome these early adoption challenges, but it is often hard to predict whether it will succeed. Of particular importance in determining the outcome is correlation in how users value the individual technologies being bundled. The article proposes simple models that can help explore this question in a principled manner and illustrates the type of insight they provide by means of a few simple examples.
There are several limitations to the model investigated in the article. First, although user affinities are by construction heterogeneous across users, the model presumes externality and cost parameters that are homogeneous across users. Second, the net utility is assumed to be simply the sum of the affinity, externality, and cost. Third, the cost (externality) of the bundle is taken to be the sum of the individual costs (externalities), respectively. Fourth, the externality is chosen to be linear (per user) in the adoption level; recent work [Briscoe et al. 2006 ] has made a case that this conventional quadratic form of Metcalfe's Law is not correct. Fifth, prices are fixed and the equilibria we have identified would naturally change if service providers were allowed to change their service costs, or adoption costs could be offset, such as through the introduction of incentives. Finally, we have restricted our attention to the relatively simple case of uniformly distributed affinities, whether continuous or discrete. Nonetheless, in spite of all these simplifications, the model is still able to produce a diverse array of behavior of bundled and separate offering equilibrium levels.
In addition to the preceding limitations, there are many extensions that are desirable for the basic models described in the article and their ability to realistically capture how technologies interact, for example, the extent to which they are complements or substitutes, or whether they exhibit economies of scope. The methodology outlined in the article, however, offers a first step towards developing a fundamental understanding of the role that bundling can play in helping network technologies overcome initial adoption hurdles.
APPENDIXES

A.1. Generating and Characterizing Correlated Random Variables
The generation of a pair of correlated uniform random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) is based on the following proposition. PROPOSITION A.1 [PEARSON 1907; HOTELLING AND PABST 1936] . Let (Z 1 , Z 2 ) be a pair of independent standard normal RVs and fix ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. Then
are standard normal RVs with correlation ρ. Further, U = (U 1 , U 2 ) with U i = F Z (Y i ) for i ∈ {1, 2} are uniform RVs with correlation
Remark A.2. Selecting ρ = 2 sin(πρ * /6) for a target correlation ρ * ensures ρ U = ρ * . In what follows we will work with ρ as the correlation parameter, even though ρ U is the actual correlation 9 .
From Proposition A.1 it is immediate to obtain the joint CDF on (U 1 , U 2 ) in terms of the correlation ρ, and from there the joint PDF.
PROPOSITION A.4. The joint CDF and joint PDF of (U 1 , U 2 ) in Proposition A.1 at (u 1 , u 2 ) are
PROOF. The joint CDF of (U 1 , U 2 ) at (u 1 , u 2 ) is
Changing the variables from z 1 to v 1 = F Z (z 1 ) gives Eq. (20). Differentiation with respect to (u 1 , u 2 ) gives
and applying the inverse function theorem gives the joint PDF in Eq. (21).
The joint PDF f U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ) is illustrated in Figure 4 for ρ ∈ ± 1 2 . The following proposition shows that this joint distribution recovers the distributions of perfectly negatively correlated, independent, and perfectly positively correlated uniform random variables as ρ → {−1, 0, +1}, respectively. 9 A further justification for this equivocation is the fact that ρ U (ρ) ≈ ρ. In fact max |ρ U (ρ) − ρ| over ρ ∈ [−1, 1] occurs at ρ c = ± 4π 2 − 36/π ≈ ±0.593664 where ρ U (ρ c ) = ± 6 π sin −1 ( π 2 − 9/π ) ≈ ±0.575581, so the maximum deviation of ρ U (ρ) from ρ is |ρ U (ρ c ) − ρ c | ≈ 0.01808. 
corresponding to U 1 + U 2 = 1 (almost surely), (U 1 , U 2 ) independent, and U 1 = U 2 (almost surely), respectively.
PROOF. Since the integral is over a finite support and the integrand is continuous,
It follows that F U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ) → u 1 u 2 as ρ → 0. Next, as ρ → 1 observe as u 2 ≷ v 1 the function inside F Z (·) in Eq. (25) goes to ±∞, respectively. Thus
and so lim ρ→1 F U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ) = min{u 1 , u 2 }. Finally, as ρ → −1 observe as F −1 Z (u 2 ) + F −1 Z (v 1 ) ≷ 0 the function inside F Z (·) in Eq. (25) goes to ±∞, respectively. Observe
Thus
The following two functions are central to the subsequent proposition. These are 
and PDF
for ψ u,ρ (v) in Eq. (29) and φ u,ρ (v) in Eq. (30). Further, F U (1) = 1/2 for all ρ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION A.6. From Eq. (18), the CDF of U = U 1 + U 2 in terms of the independently and identically distributed (iid) standard normal random variables (Z 1 , Z 2 ) and the correlation parameter ρ is
For u ∈ (0, 1] condition on z 1 ∈ R, split the integral at z 1 = F −1 Z (u), and note the event of interest cannot occur for z 1 > F −1 Z (u).
Simplification gives the top equation in Eq. (36). For u ∈ (1, 2] condition on z 1 ∈ R, split the integral at z 1 = F −1 Z (u − 1), and notice the event of interest is
Simplification gives the bottom equation in Eq. (36).
Changing the variables from z 1 to v = F Z (z 1 ) obtains Eq. (31). Apply the Leibniz integral rule to differentiate F U (u) and apply the inverse function theorem. For u ∈ [0, 1],
Change variables from z 1 to v = F Z (z 1 ) to obtain the top equation in Eq. (32). Likewise, for u ∈ (1, 2],
Changing the variables from z 1 to v = F Z (z 1 ) gives the bottom equation in Eq. (32). Finally, we show F U (1) = 1/2 for all ρ.
Set a = − (1 + ρ)/(1 − ρ) and write the last expression given before as
using the change of variable z = F −1 Z (v). The derivative with respect to a is
for g 2 (z, a) ≡ zf Z (az) f Z (z). Now observe g 2 (z, a) = −g 2 (−z, a), that is, g 2 (z, a) is an odd function in z for all a and thus g 1 (a) = 0, and g 1 (a) is a constant for all a. Using the 
Thus F U (1) = 1/2 for all ρ.
Representative plots of the CDF and PDF for U in Proposition A.6 are shown in Figure 5 .
Remark A.7. Correlation is not in general a sufficient parameter to completely capture the dependence of the adoption level on the joint distribution. In fact, we expect that the adoption levels of two joint distributions on [0, 1] 2 with uniform marginals and common correlation may have distinct adoption levels, precisely because the solution of h(x) = x depends upon the distribution of the aggregate affinity, F U . Nonetheless, we view the correlation parameter as an insightful knob to vary in order to highlight the fact that the adoption level is quite sensitive to the joint distribution of the affinities.
A.2. Separate Adoption Equilibria under Uniformly Distributed User Affinities
Proposition 4.1 characterized the possible equilibria for separate service offerings when the user service affinities are uniform random variables. The results are illustrated in Figure 6 . for adoption thresholds l ≡ c−2 e , m ≡ c−1 e , and r ≡ c e . The function h(x) has the following properties:
A.3. Bundle Adoption Equilibria under Continuous User Affinity Distributions
(1) h (x) = e f U (c − ex) ≥ 0;
(2) h (x) = −e 2 f U (c − ex);
(3) h(m) = 1 2 .
Stable equilibria include x * ∈ {0, 1}, where x * = 0 is an equilibrium provided h(0) = 0 ⇔ c > 2 and x * = 1 is an equilibrium provided h(1) = 1 ⇔ c < e. PROOF. Eq. (43) is immediate from the definition h(x) = P(U > c − ex) in Eq. (4) and Proposition A.6. The first two properties are immediate from the definition of h(x) and the fact that the CDF of U is differentiable, by assumption. The property h(m) = 1/2 follows immediately from F U (1) = 1/2 in Proposition A.6.
As stated in Corollary 4.4, bundle adoption equilibria satisfy h(x) = x with solutions given by Eq. (10). Figure 7 displays the functions h(x) and x for two different examples: one for (c = 1.5, e = 1.7) and the other for (c = 2.5, e = 3.4). The figure also illustrates adoption dynamics under a discrete step adoption process. In the case (c = 2.5, e = 3.4), two initial adoption levels are shown, x(0) = 0.4 and x(0) = 0.45, that illustrate convergence to different equilibria 0 and 1 as a function of the initial adoption level.
The regions in Eq. (11) are illustrated in Figure 8 , which illustrates their shape. Observe that: (i) e = 2(c − 1) is the solution of ξ * l,± = m and ξ * r,± = m; (ii) e = 1/(2(2 − c)) is the solution of 2(c − 2)e + 1 = 0 where 2(c − 2)e + 1 is the discriminant of ξ * l,± in Eq. (10); and (iii) e = 1 2 (c + √ c 2 − 2) is the solution of 2(e − c)e + 1 = 0 where 2(e − c)e + 1 is the discriminant of ξ * r,± in Eq. (10).
A.4. Joint Affinity Distribution via the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) Copula
A (two-dimensional) copula C(u 1 , u 2 ) is a function C : [0, 1] 2 → [0, 1] specifying a joint distribution on a pair of random variables, say (X 1 , X 2 ), via F X 1 ,X 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = C(F X 1 (x 1 ), F X 2 (u 2 )).
See Nelsen [1998] for a complete specification. Copulas are of natural interest in our context as they provide a means of constructing joint distributions with specified (in our case, uniform) marginals. Although there are many families of copulas of potential interest, we focus on the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula family [Nelsen 1998, Example 3 .12] with parameter θ .
C FGM (u 1 , u 2 ; θ ) = u 1 u 2 (1 + θ (1 − u 1 )(1 − u 2 )), (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 , θ ∈ [−1, 1]
It is known that ρ = θ/3 [Schucany et al. 1978, Eq. (11) ] and so the range of correlations expressible by the FGM copula is limited to ρ ∈ [−1/3, +1/3]. Application of Eq. (44) Fig. 9 . The CDF for U = U 1 + U 2 when (U 1 , U 2 ) have a joint distribution derived from the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula in (45) with θ ∈ {−1, −1/2, 0, 1/2, 1}.
and Eq. (45) to the case of uniform random variables (U 1 , U 2 ) yields the joint CDF F U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ) = C FGM (u 1 , u 2 ; θ ); the required uniform marginal distributions are evident as F U 1 (u 1 ) = C FGM (u 1 , 1; θ ) = u 1 and F U 2 (u 2 ) = C FGM (1, u 2 ; θ ) = u 2 . It is straightforward to compute the CDF of U = U 1 + U 2 as
as illustrated in Figure 9 . 
for l ≡ c−2 e , m ≡ c−1 e , and r ≡ c e . The equilibria adoption levels x * are the solutions of h(x) = x; the equilibria values will depend upon c, e, θ, and, as evident from Eq. (47), will be the solution of a fourth-order polynomial equation. Observe that the case θ = 0 yields F U 1 ,U 2 (u 1 , u 2 ) = u 1 u 2 , that is, U 1 , U 2 independent, which was the focus of Section 4.5. In particular, the difficulties encountered in trying to characterize the equilibria under independent affinities are exacerbated for the FGM copula, as the former is a special case of the latter. Figure 10 illustrates possible adoption equilibria under discrete user affinities, as well as the regions of the (c i , e i ) plane to which they correspond. 
A.5. Separate Adoption Equilibria under Discrete User Affinities
A.6. Bundle Adoption Equilibria under Discrete User Affinities
